Home Research Curriculum Vita


WORKING PAPERS:
  • Learning-by-shirking in relational contracts
    (with Jin Li and Luis Vasconcelos) [pdf]
  • On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
    (with Sourav Bhattacharya and Maria Goltsman) [pdf]
  • On the trade-off between efficiency in job assignment and turnover: the role of break-up fees
    (with Luis Vasconcelos) [pdf]
PUBLICATIONS:
  • Relational contracts with subjective peer evaluations
    RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 47 (2016) pp. 3 28 (with Joyee Deb and Jin Li) [pdf]
  • Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence
    RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 44 (2013) pp. 522 544 (with Sourav Bhattacharya) [pdf]
  • Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets
    Journal of Law Economics & Organization, Vol. 28 (2012), pp. 754 782 (with Luis Vasconcelos) [pdf]
  • Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure
    Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 29 (2011), pp. 229 265 (with Maria Goltsman) [pdf]
  • Optimal Job Design in the Presence of Implicit Contracts
    RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 42 (2011), pp. 44 69 (with Luis Vasconcelos) [pdf]
  • The Optimal Disclosure Policy when Firms Offer Implicit Contracts
    RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 41 (2010), pp. 549 573 [pdf]
  • Deregulation Redux: Does Mandating Access to Bottleneck Facilities Necessarily Improve Welfare?
    Public Choice, Vol. 142 (2010, Special Issue), pp. 363 377 (with Richard Higgins) [pdf]
  • Disclosure or Secrecy? The Economics of Open Science
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 27 (2009), pp. 449 462 (with Scott Stern) [pdf]
  • Career Concerns, Matching, and Optimal Disclosure Policy
    International Economic Review, Vol. 49 (2008), pp. 1211 1250 [pdf]
  • Sustaining Implicit Contracts When Agents Have Career Concerns: The Role of Information Disclosure
    RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39 (2008), pp. 469 490 [pdf]